

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

MEMO CHOUD

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		✓		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		✓		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	<i>unclassified</i>	✓			
21	<i>SECRET</i>		✓		
22	<i>unclassified</i>		✓		

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

D/Executive Secretary

Date

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TOP SECRET

28 February 1983


MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Soviet Arms Control Negotiating Objectives

1. Here's how I would compress and cross-reference the Key Judgments on Soviet arms control negotiating objectives.

2. In addition, at the outset I would make clear that this estimate is a companion piece with 11-3-8 and the one on monitoring and incorporate significant elements of the other two by reference.



William J. Casey

Attachment

TOP SECRET



25X1

TOP SECRET DCI
28 Feb 83

In our review of 20 years of US-Soviet arms control negotiations, we have seen how the US sought to achieve political objectives such as lead Western nations to unilaterally slow their military programs, promote detente, gain recognition as a co-equal superpower, foster divisions in NATO and erode confidence in the US nuclear umbrella as well as military objectives such as protecting their own weapons programs, limiting NATO military capabilities and blunting Western technological superiority. There are shared arms control objectives like reducing risks of accidental war, environmental dangers and nuclear proliferation and fostering a more predictable basis for military planning.

[Cite negotiations in which specific objectives were highlighted.]

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